No. 23-7051, __ F.4th __ (D.C. Cir. 2025)
D.C. Circuit Court
August 15, 2025
Keywords: federal employee, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), labor organization, discrimination, disability, sex/gender, arbitration, retaliation, unfair labor practice, misconduct, Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, jurisdiction, traumatic brain injury (TBI), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Summary
This case shows the relationship between the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (“FSLMRS”) and three anti-discrimination statutes. The question before the court was whether the FSLMRS stops claims brought under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).
The FSLMRS oversees the roles and responsibilities of unions. The FSLMRS requires a duty of fair representation, to make sure that unions provide equal representation to all employees in their bargaining unit. The FSLMRS bans discrimination in union representation.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibits employers and labor organizations from discriminating based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities; it applies to both employers and unions. Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)to investigate and enforce both Title VII and the ADA.
The FLSA, unlike the other laws in this case, is a wage-and-hour law. Instead of preventing discrimination, the law is designed to stop labor conditions that prevent an employee from having a minimal standard of living. The FLSA has an anti-retaliation provision which stops “any person” from discharging or discriminating against any employee that engages in activities protected by the statute. Protected activities include filing a grievance, “whistleblower” activities, joining a union, or refusing an order that is against the law.
Nia Lucas, a former federal employee filed two suits saying that her union mismanaged an arbitration proceeding and discriminated against her based on sex and disability. In her first suit, she claimed that her union and its local violated Title VII and the ADA. In her second suit, she alleged that the union, its local, and two union officials retaliated against her in violation of the FLSA.
The district court dismissed both suits for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court believed that the FSLMRS prohibits the plaintiff’s claims. And that the claims could only be brought through administrative process. On appeal. the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit ruled that the FSLMRS allows a parallel case to be brought under Title VII and the ADA. But the court added that the retaliation case brought under the FLSA was prohibited because such claims can only be processed through the FLRA’s administrative process.
Facts of the Case
These are two consolidated cases. Ms. Lucas was a woman with a traumatic brain injury (TBI) who worked for the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) between 2017 and 2020. Ms. Lucas believed that the SBA discriminated against her and had not properly paid her. In late 2017, she brought these allegations to her union’s local chapter (local).
In early 2018, the local’s new president, Johnnie Green, filed a workplace grievance on Lucas’ behalf. Green also told Ms. Lucas that the union had previously discriminated against women with disabilities. And so, Green scheduled an arbitration hearing on Lucas’ behalf.
Around this time, Green began professing love for Ms. Lucas and making unwanted sexual advances towards her. Ms. Lucas told Green to stop and reported his behavior to Michael Kelly, one of the union’s national officers.
Before stepping down as Lucas’ designated representative ahead of the arbitration hearing, he told her that she had neither a right nor a need for a hearing considering she had recently given birth and was a nursing mother—he added that as a mother, Ms. Lucas’ was a burden to the union.
At Mr. Green’s instruction, the local suspended the arbitration hearing after it had begun. Six months later, Ms. Lucas filed an Unfair Labor Practice (“ULP”) charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority complaining of Mr. Green’s harassment and the hearing delay. In response to her charge, Mr. Green called Lucas and insulted and threatened her.
Lucas filed two more ULP charges. The first charge asserted that the union wrong to withdraw from the arbitration proceedings. The second charge said that Kelly colluded with Green to restrict her rights as an employee in the union’s bargaining unit.
Lucas also filed a discrimination charge against the union with the EEOC. The EEOC declined to pursue the matter and issued Ms. Lucas a right to sue letter. Ms. Lucas then filed two lawsuits in the district court. The first named the union and the local as defendants and alleged violations of Title VII and the ADA. The second named the union, the local, Mr. Green, and Mr. Kelly, as defendants. That suit alleged that the local’s withdrawal from the arbitration proceedings constituted retaliation in violation of the FLSA.
The district court dismissed both suits claiming they did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The court said that the FSLMRS precluded Lucas’ claims. The court said that her charges amounted to claims for breach of fair representation, which must be pursued through the FLRA’s administrative process.
Lucas appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit.
Issues of the Case
- Do the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII and ADA claims against federal-employee unions if those claims are based on conduct that could also support unfair representation claims?
- Do the federal courts have jurisdiction over claims against federal-sector unions under FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision?
Arguments and Analysis
The court ruled that federal courts have jurisdiction over Title VII and ADA claims that overlap with FSLMRS—so the district court was wrong to dismiss that lawsuit based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also ruled that Lucas’ FLSA retaliation claim falls within the FLRA’s purview because it concerns the conduct of a union representative. There was no reason to think that Congress intended the federal courts to have jurisdiction for cases brought under the FLSA—so the district court was correct to dismiss the case due to subject-matter jurisdiction.
1. Do federal courts have jurisdiction over Title VII and ADA claims against federal-employee unions if those claims are premised on conduct that could also support unfair representation claims?
For Ms. Lucas’ Title VII and ADA claims, the court ruled that the FSLMRS allows matching claims in federal court because those laws target discrimination by labor organizations. And because neither Title VII nor the ADA are general procedural “catch-all” statutes like the Administrative Procedure Act.
The court noted that there is a long history of concurrent and overlapping remedies for discrimination in other contexts. For example, federal employees suing their employers, and private-sector employees suing their unions. Moreover, the court discussed how the FSLMRS provides weaker remedies than Title VII and the ADA: including no stated entitlement to financial damages, punitive damages, or attorney’s fees. The court added that FSLMRS claims rarely result in judicial review because ULP charges are decided by the FLRA General Counsel and cannot be reviewed.
Brought together, the court decided that Ms. Lucas’ claims should not have been dismissed by the district court because Congress allows many ways for employees to seek relief for discrimination, including the Title VII and ADA suit that Lucas brought. The court reversed the decision of the lower court and sent it back for additional court proceedings.
2. Do federal courts have jurisdiction over claims against federal-sector unions under FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision?
For Ms. Lucas’ FLSA claim, the court ruled that the FLSA is a wage-and-hour law, not an antidiscrimination law. There is no general norm of concurrent jurisdiction for retaliation claims in wage-and-hour disputes.
The court went on to say that, unlike Title VII and the ADA, the FLSA does not clearly apply its prohibition against retaliation to “labor organizations.” Instead, the law uses the general term “any person.” The court decided that Lucas’ FLSA retaliation claim falls under FLRA’s and Congress meant for claims like Ms. Lucas to be dealt with only through the administrative process. The court added that there is no part of the law that allows an FLSA retaliation claim to be brought in federal court.
Finally, the court ruled that Lucas’ FLSA retaliation claim had to be decided through the FLRA’s administrative process, and the district court properly dismissed that case based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Rulings
The court sent the first case back to the lower court because the FSLMRS allows parallel claims in federal court. The court agreed with the lower court in the second case. The court believed that the FSLMRS does not allow FLSA claims to be brought in federal court and should be decided within FLRA’s administrative process.
Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part
One judge on the panel agreed in part and disagreed in another part. For her concurrence, the judge agreed with the majority holding that Lucas is barred from bringing an FLSA claim in federal court.
But that judge would have held that there was no basis in the law, or Supreme Court precedent, to allow a plaintiff to bring parallel suits under FSLMRS and Title VII and the ADA in federal court.
In this case, that judge believed that Lucas could not bring her Title VII and ADA claims in federal court because they could be decided through an administrative agency. In this case the judge would have ruled that the district court should have dismissed both causes of action based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Link
- Full Case: Lucas v. AFGE, No. 23-7051, __ F.4th __ (D.C. Cir. 2025).
Web: law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cadc/23-7051/23-7051-2025-08-15.html
These materials do not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon in any individual case. Please consult an attorney licensed in your state for legal advice and/or representation. These materials were prepared by the legal research staff of the Burton Blatt Institute (BBI) at Syracuse University in partnership with the Southeast ADA Center to highlight legal and policy developments relevant to civil rights protections and the impact of court decisions in the Southeast Region under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). These materials are based on federal disability rights laws and court decisions in effect at the time of publication. Federal and state disability rights law can change at any time. In addition, state and local laws and regulations may provide different or additional protections. Materials are intended solely as informal guidance, and are neither a determination of your legal rights nor responsibilities under the ADA or other federal, state, and local laws, nor binding on any agency with enforcement responsibility under the ADA. The accuracy of any information contained herein is not warranted. Any links to external websites are provided as a courtesy and are not intended to nor do they constitute an endorsement of the linked materials.
